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Abstract
From the beginning of 2003 to the spring of 2004, Japan’s monetary authorities
conducted large-scale yen-selling/dollar-buying operations in what Taylor (2006)
has labeled the “Great Intervention.” This paper examines the relationship be-
tween this “Great Intervention” and the quantitative easing policy the Bank of
Japan was pursuing at that time. First, we ﬁnd that about 40 percent of the
yen funds supplied to the market by yen-selling interventions were not oﬀset by
the BOJ’s monetary operations and remained in the market for a while; this is
in contrast with the preceding period, when almost 100 percent were immedi-
ately oﬀset. Second, comparing interventions and other government payments, the
extent to which the funds were oﬀset was much smaller in the case of interven-
tions, suggesting that the BOJ diﬀerentiated between, and responded diﬀerently
to, interventions and other government payments. These two ﬁndings indicate that
it is likely that the BOJ intentionally did not sterilize yen-selling interventions to
achieve its policy target of maintaining the current account balances of commercial
banks at the BOJ at a high level. Finally, we ﬁnd that an unsterilized intervention
had a greater impact on the yen-dollar rate than a sterilized one, suggesting that
it matters whether an intervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is
in a liquidity trap.
JEL Classication Number: F30; E52; E58
Keywords: foreign exchange intervention; sterilization; quantitative easing
Correspondence: Tsutomu Watanabe, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo. E-
mail: watanabe@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp. We would like to thank John Taylor, Owen Humpage, Takatoshi Ito,
John Leahy, Mototsugu Shintani, Kazuo Ueda, and Lars Svensson for useful comments on an earlier
version of this paper. This research forms part of a project on “Understanding Inﬂation Dynamics of
the Japanese Economy” funded by a JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Creative Scientiﬁc Research (18GS0101).
In addition, Yabu gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the JSPS (Grant-in-Aid for Young
Scientists B20730203).
yFaculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University. E-mail: tomoyoshi.yabu@gmail.com.1 Introduction
During the period from 2001 to 2006, the Japanese monetary authorities pursued two
interesting policies. The ﬁrst of these is the quantitative easing policy introduced by
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in March 2001. This step was motivated by the fact that
although the overnight call rate, the BOJ’s policy rate, had reached its lower bound
at zero percent, it failed to suﬃciently stimulate the economy. To achieve further
monetary easing, the BOJ therefore changed the policy variable from the interest rate
to the money supply. The quantitative easing policy remained in place until March
2006, by which time the Japanese economy had started to recover. The second major
policy during this period were interventions in the foreign exchange market by Japan’s
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the BOJ, which engaged in large-scale selling of the
yen from January 2003 to March 2004.1 Taylor (2006) has called this the “Great
Intervention.” The interventions during this period occurred at a frequency of once
every two business days, with the amount involved per daily intervention averaging
286 billion yen and the total reaching 35 trillion yen. Even for Japan’s monetary
authorities, which are known for their active interventionism, this frequency as well as
the sums involved were unprecedented.
The main focus of this paper is on how these two policies were related to each
other. Researchers often maintain that monetary policy and exchange rate interventions
are independent policies.2 That is, under normal circumstances, monetary policy is
conducted by setting a target level for very short-term interest rates (e.g., the federal
funds rate in the US, the overnight call rate in Japan) and adjusting the quantity of base
money on a daily basis to maintain that level. If the amount of yen funds circulating
in the market increases or decreases as a result of foreign exchange interventions,
overnight interest rates would deviate from the target level. To avoid this, the central
bank oﬀsets the funds supplied to, or absorbed from, the market by the foreign exchange
interventions. The central banks of the advanced economies sterilize foreign exchange
interventions in this way – an observation that has been conﬁrmed by a large number
of empirical studies. As long as such sterilization is conducted, monetary policy and
foreign exchange interventions are not mutually related.
But did such sterilization also occur even during the period of the “Great Inter-
vention”? In addressing this question, it should be noted that the target level for the
1In Japan, it is the MOF which is in charge of foreign exchange interventions. It conducts inter-
ventions in conjunction with the BOJ.
2See, for example, Craig and Humpage (2001).
2overnight call rate was practically zero during this period. Therefore, even if yen funds
are additionally supplied to the market by yen-selling interventions, the overnight rate,
which is already zero, will not deviate from the target level, so that the BOJ does not
need to sterilize those interventions. Rather, the BOJ has reason to actively choose not
to sterilize them, because the yen funds supplied through interventions help it to in-
crease base money and thereby achieve its target for commercial bank current account
balances at the BOJ.
Taylor (2006) points out that the reason why the US Treasury, which in the past
had been critical of Japan’s yen-selling interventions, approved of such interventions
at this period is that they provided additional support for the BOJ’s quantitative
easing policy. According to this view, Japan’s MOF conducted large-scale yen-selling
interventions, which the BOJ did not sterilize, thus allowing an increase in base money,
which eventually contributed to the recovery of the Japanese economy.3 However, the
BOJ maintained that there was no causal relationship between large-scale yen-selling
interventions and quantitative easing. For example, responding to the report in August
2003 that both yen-selling interventions and the increase in the outstanding balance
of current accounts at the BOJ since the beginning of the year amounted to about 10
trillion yen, the Deputy Governor of the BOJ, Kazumasa Iwata, simply stated that
this was “coincidence.”4
To empirically examine whether there was a relationship between foreign exchange
interventions and monetary policy during that period, we use daily data of current
account balances at the BOJ and the amount of foreign exchange interventions. We
ﬁnd that around 60 percent of the yen funds supplied to the market by yen-selling
interventions were oﬀset by monetary operations by the BOJ (i.e., sterilized), while
the remaining 40 percent were not oﬀset. Moreover, the funds that were not oﬀset
remained in the market for a while. This is in contrast with the preceding period when
nearly 100 percent were oﬀset immediately. We also ﬁnd that, comparing interventions
and other government payments, the extent to which the funds were oﬀset was much
smaller in the case of interventions, suggesting that the BOJ diﬀerentiated between,
and responded diﬀerently to, interventions and other government payments. These
two ﬁndings indicate that it is likely that the BOJ intentionally did not sterilize yen-
3The same point was made at the time by Svensson (2001) and Hamada (1999) among others.
4On the other hand, in a statement in December 1999, the Governor acknowledged that the BOJ
has employed the method of increasing the money base by leaving the funds of yen-selling foreign
exchange interventions in the market, saying that “[t]he Bank has been ﬂexibly providing ample funds
to the short-term money market taking account of factors including yen liquidity arising from foreign
exchange intervention.”
3selling interventions to achieve its policy target of maintaining commercial bank current
account balances at the BOJ at a high level. Finally, we ﬁnd that an unsterilized
intervention had a greater impact on the yen-dollar rate than a sterilized one, indicating
that it matters whether an intervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is
in a liquidity trap. This result suggests that unsterilized interventions aﬀected the
exchange rate through a change in market participants’ expectations about future
money supply.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the quanti-
tative easing policy and the “Great Intervention” in more detail. Section 3 investigates
the contemporaneous correlation between interventions and changes in current account
balances at the BOJ, while Section 4 examines the dynamic relationship between the
two. Next, Section 5 asks whether sterilized and unsterilized interventions had diﬀerent
eﬀects on the exchange rate even when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Quantitative Easing Policy and the Great Inter-
vention
2.1 The quantitative easing policy
The BOJ decided to introduce its quantitative easing policy on March 19, 2001 (see
Table 1 for a chronology of monetary policy measures in Japan).5 The aim of this
policy was to stimulate eﬀective demand by providing ample supplies of base money.
The target level for outstanding current account balances at the BOJ was initially set
at 5 trillion yen, meaning that the target level exceeded the level of required reserves,
which were approximately 4 trillion yen, by about 1 trillion yen.
We would like to highlight two features of the quantitative easing policy which are
often overlooked by researchers but have important implications when examining the
relationship with foreign exchange interventions. The ﬁrst is that there were frequent
changes in the target level for current account balances at the BOJ. After the initial
level had been set at 5 trillion yen in March 2001, the target level was raised to 6
trillion yen less than half a year later, in August 2001. By December of that year,
5Before introducing quantitative easing, the BOJ had adopted, between February 1999 and August
2000, a zero interest rate policy, which aimed to keep the target level for the overnight interest rate
at zero. Although the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy have in common
that they aim to maintain the overnight interest rate at zero, they diﬀer in that the latter seeks to
aﬀect aggregate demand not through the price channel (i.e., the interest rate channel) but through the
various quantity channels, including the so-called portfolio rebalancing channel.
4Table 1: Chronology of Monetary Policy Decisions in 1999-2006
Date Event
09/09/98 The BOJ reduces the target overnight (O/N) rate to 0.25 from 0.50 percent
02/12/99 The BOJ introduces a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)
04/13/99 Governor Masaru Hayami announces the BOJ will continue the ZIRP
until “deﬂationary concerns are dispelled”
10/13/99 The BOJ expands the range of money market operations
08/11/00 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP and increases the target O/N rate to 0.25 percent
02/09/01 The BOJ introduces a Lombard-type lending facility
and reduces the oﬃcial discount rate to 0.375 from 0.5 percent
02/28/01 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.125 percent
and the oﬃcial discount rate to 0.25 percent
03/19/01 The BOJ introduces a quantitative easing policy
and announces to continue it until “the core CPI records a year-on-year
increase of zero percent or more on a stable basis.”
The BOJ sets the target for current account balances (CAB) at 5 trillion yen
08/14/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 6 trillion yen
09/18/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to above 6 trillion yen
12/19/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 10–15 trillion yen
10/30/02 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 15–20 trillion yen
04/01/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 17–22 trillion yen
04/30/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 22–27 trillion yen
05/20/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–30 trillion yen
10/10/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–32 trillion yen.
The BOJ provides a more detailed description of its commitment to monetary easing
and the conditions necessary for terminating it
01/20/04 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 30–35 trillion yen
03/09/06 The BOJ terminates the quantitative easing policy
07/14/06 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP and sets the target O/N rate at 0.25 percent
the target level was further increased to a range of 10-15 trillion yen, and the target
continued to be raised at relatively short intervals until it ﬁnally reached 30-35 trillion
yen in January 2004. What is important is not only that the target of current account
balances was at a high level, but also that it was revised quite frequently.
Second, since December 2001, the target for current account balances was no longer
a point value but a range. For example, in January 2004, the range was set at 30-35
trillion yen, meaning that ﬂuctuations up to 5 trillion yen were acceptable. Although
the BOJ has not explained why it set a target range or on what basis it decided that
this range would be 5 trillion yen, looking at the BOJ’s actual monetary policy conduct,
which is shown in Figure 1, it is clear that it actually permitted ﬂuctuations within
this range. This pattern is especially obvious in the period from 2003, the period of
main interest in this paper. To examine this point in more detail, Figure 2 depicts the
distribution of the actual values of daily current account balances during the period
when the target range was 30-35 trillion yen, i.e., from January 2004 to March 2006. The
ﬁgure shows that the mode of the distribution is at 33.7 trillion yen and the frequency
5declines toward the fringes of the range. Thus, it can be conjectured that even though
the BOJ had set a provisional target level of 33.7 trillion yen, it was prepared to
accept divergences from that level at times of large autonomous disturbances through
the inﬂow and outﬂow of funds, such as foreign exchange interventions. We will discuss
the implications of these two characteristics of the quantitative easing policy in Section
4.
2.2 The Great Intervention
Figure 3 shows the daily value of foreign exchange interventions between 2001 and
2007. As can be seen, the pattern of intervention is quite remarkable, showing a high
frequency of intervention during the period from January 15, 2003 to March 16, 2004.
As described by Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007), it is the MOF, and in particular
the Vice Minister of Finance for International Aﬀairs, who plays a leading role in foreign
exchange interventions, and it is conspicuous that interventions were concentrated in
the period when Zembei Mizoguchi was in this post. Compared with the period of
his predecessors, Sakakibara and Kuroda (who held the post between June 1995 and
January 2002), the frequency of intervention increased remarkably from, on average,
once every forty days to once every two days. Moreover, whereas the total amount of
interventions under Sakakibara and Kuroda came to 26 trillion yen, under Mizoguchi
it reached 35 trillion yen, providing further indication of heavy intervention during a
short period.
3 Contemporaneous Correlation Between Interventions
and Changes in Current Account Balances
We now turn to examining whether there is a correlation between changes in current
account balances and foreign exchange interventions. If there is a positive correlation
between the two, this would mean that foreign exchange interventions were not steril-
ized. Conversely, no correlation would mean that interventions were fully sterilized.6
6In order to conduct yen-selling interventions, the MOF has to raise yen funds. One way to do so is
to issue ﬁnancing bills (FBs) on the same day as the intervention is conducted. In that case, because
the MOF immediately returns the yen funds that it obtained by issuing FBs to the market through
the intervention, the amount of yen funds circulating in the market does not change at all. However,
in practice, such an automatic sterilization does not take place because there is a time gap of about
two months between foreign exchange interventions and the issuing of FBs; as a result, when the MOF
intervenes by selling yen, the amount of yen funds circulating at that point in time actually increases
unless the BOJ conducts monetary operations to absorb them. For details on the practicalities of
foreign exchange market interventions in Japan, see Ito (2003).
6Let us begin by examining the relationship between the two with a simple scatter
plot. Figure 4 plots daily data, with the horizontal axis depicting the intervention
amounts and the vertical axis showing the change in current account balances. The
sample consists of observations from 1992 onward and is divided into the periods before
and after December 19, 2001, the date on which the BOJ ﬁrst set a target range for
current account balances. Current account balances at the end of day t are denoted by
Rt, while the value of yen sales/dollar purchases conducted on day t is denoted by It.
Thus, the vertical axis in Figure 4 shows ∆Rt and the horizontal axis It 2. The value
of interventions at t 2 is used because the settlement of funds takes place two business
days after interventions were executed. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, there is almost
no correlation between the two in the ﬁrst half of the sample period. In contrast, in
the latter half of the sample period, a weak correlation can be observed.
We examine this diﬀerence by estimating a simple equation of the form
∆Rt = µ + βIt 2 + ut, (1)
where ut is an iid disturbance term.7 This speciﬁcation has been widely used in previous
studies to measure the extent of sterilization, including Fatum and Hutchison (2005)
and Ito (2004), both of which investigate the BOJ’s behavior in the recent period. The
results are presented in Table 2. As for the ﬁrst period, we ﬁnd that the estimated value
of β at -0.004 is close to zero and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of β = 0. In other
words, we cannot reject the null that interventions during this period were completely
sterilized. In contrast, for the latter period, at 0.389, β is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, suggesting that approximately 60 percent of the value of foreign exchange
interventions was sterilized, while the remaining 40 percent was not.8
We use equation (1) to conduct a rolling regression in order to examine the change
in the coeﬃcient β over time. The window of the rolling regression is the preceding 750
days. The results are presented in Figure 5, which shows the estimated value of β as
well as the 90 percent conﬁdence interval. The ﬁgure indicates that while until 2000, β
7By deﬁnition, ∆Rt is equal to commercial banks’ net receipts of yen funds on day t from the
government and the central bank. The intervention amount to be settled on day t, It 2, is part of the
net receipts from the government, and the amount of monetary operations for sterilization, which is
denoted by  (1   β)It 2, is also part of the net receipts from the central bank. We sum up these two
(i.e., It 2 (1 β)It 2 = βIt 2) to obtain equation (1). Note that all other types of commercial banks’
receipts of yen funds from the government and the central bank are included in the disturbance term
ut.
8During the period of the Great Intervention, foreign exchange interventions totaling 35 trillion yen
were carried out. At the same time, current account balances at the BOJ during this period increased
from 20 trillion yen to 33 trillion yen. As it happens, this increase in current account balances of 13
yen trillion is equivalent to approximately 40 percent of the value of foreign exchange interventions.
7Table 2: Contemporaneous Correlation Between Interventions and Changes in Current
Account Balances
Entire sample period 1992/1/1-2001/12/18 2001/12/19-2006/3/9
Constant -0.016* -0.006 -0.046**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.020)
It 2 0.188* -0.004 0.389***
(0.103) (0.151) (0.116)
R2 0.052 0.016 0.162
Obs. 3,496 2,461 1,035
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.
is zero or below zero, it turns positive in September 2001 and from March 2003 onward
becomes large and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, after 2003, the value of
β is relatively stable at around 0.4.
4 The Dynamic Relationship Between Interventions and
Current Account Balances
4.1 Did interventions have a permanent impact on current account
balances?
The analysis in the previous section indicates that yen-selling interventions aﬀected
current account balances at least on the day of intervention (more precisely, on the
settlement day of interventions) during the Great Intervention period. But how per-
sistent were they? Did interventions have a permanent impact on the level of current
account balances? These are key questions asked by previous papers on the optimal
monetary policy in a liquidity trap. Speciﬁcally, Jeanne and Svensson (2007) and Eg-
gertsson (2006) argue that a permanent increase in base money resulting from a yen-
selling intervention will eﬀectively stimulate aggregate demand even when the economy
is caught in a liquidity trap. They suggest that the purchase of foreign currency by
issuing money (i.e., unsterilized intervention) is an eﬀective way to make a credible
commitment to future reﬂation, because it will incur balance-sheet losses if the cen-
tral bank (and the government) reneges on its inﬂation promise, thereby causing an
exchange rate appreciation.
The ﬁrst thing to note when addressing whether interventions had a permanent













Notes: Same as Table 2.
impact on current account balances is that this question only arises because of the way
that the quantitative easing policy was implemented. That is, a permanent increase is
possible only because the BOJ speciﬁed a target range rather than a target level for
current account balances and updated it over time. Without such ﬂexibility, any per-
manent increases in current account balances resulting from yen-selling interventions
would simply mean a failure of the BOJ’s targeting policy.
There are two ways how interventions possibly can have a permanent impact on cur-
rent account balances in this policy setting. The ﬁrst is that a yen-selling intervention
is settled exactly on the day when the target for current account balances is updated;
therefore, yen funds supplied to the market through the yen-selling intervention can
remain there permanently without violating the target for current account balances.
To examine this possibility, we compare the timing of interventions and the timing
of changes in the target for current account balances during the Great Intervention
period. There are ﬁve episodes of a change in the target for current account balances
during the Great Intervention period. Figure 6 shows the intervention amounts to be
settled on days before and after the day of a change in the target for current account
balances, day T, for each of the ﬁve episodes. As can be clearly seen, almost all large-
scale interventions took place without accompanying a change in the target for current
account balances, with the exception of a large-scale intervention that was settled on
May 21, 2003, one day after the target of current account balances was updated from
22-27 trillion yen to 27-30 trillion yen.
The second possibility is that the target range was wide enough to allow for a per-
9sistent change in current account balances resulting from interventions. To investigate
this possibility, we estimate a policy reaction function of the following form:
Rt = µ + ρRt 1 + ρR
t 1 + βIt 2 + ut. (2)
The variable R
t is deﬁned as R
t  Rt 1(Rt > RU
t or Rt < RL
t ), where RU
t stands for
the upper limit of the target range and RL
t for the lower limit, and 1() represents an
indicator function that takes a value of one if the statement in the bracket is true, and
zero otherwise. That is, R
t equals Rt when Rt is outside the target range; otherwise
it equals zero. The parameter ρ is associated with the dynamic adjustment of current
account balances to the desired level, which is given by
µ
1 ρ, when current account
balances are inside the target range: the closer ρ is to 1, the slower is the convergence
to the desired level. On the other hand, ρ + ρ is associated with adjustment to the
desired level when current account balances are outside the target range. The null
hypothesis is that the BOJ permits current account balances to move freely within the
target range (and thus there is no convergence whatsoever), but once current account
balances are outside the range, they quickly converge to the desired level. Under the
null hypothesis, we should expect ρ = 1 and jρ + ρj < 1.
The regression result is presented in Table 3. In the estimation, dummy vari-
ables for changes in the target for current account balances are included. Speciﬁ-
cally, six dummy variables for the following dates are included: 2002/10/30, 2003/4/1,
2003/4/30, 2003/5/20, 2003/10/10, and 2004/1/20. Each dummy variable takes a value
of one from that date onward, and zero otherwise. The regression result when using
the entire sample period shows that ρ is positive but signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity,
implying that convergence does occur even inside the target range. More importantly,
since ρ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the diﬀerence in the speed of con-
vergence between inside and outside the target range is not signiﬁcantly large. These
results reject the null hypothesis that the BOJ permitted current account balances to
move freely within the target range, thereby allowing interventions to have a permanent
eﬀect on the level of current account balances.9
9Note that it is assumed in equation (1) that the coeﬃcient on Rt 1 is equal to unity. Therefore, R
is a non-stationary process. This is clearly inconsistent with the result in Table 3. To formally examine
whether R is a stationary or non-stationary process, we conducted a unit root test by estimating an
equation of the form Rt = µ + ρRt 1 + ut with the six dummy variables for changes in the target for
current account balances. The critical values of this unit root test are calculated through simulation.
The estimate for ρ is 0.819, which is lower than unity at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level, and therefore
rejected the null.
104.2 Temporary nonsterilization
The above results rule out the possibility that yen funds supplied through yen-selling
interventions stayed in the market permanently. However, the estimates of ρ and β
in equation (2) are both positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, implying that
some portion of yen funds supplied through interventions stayed in the market for a
while. Using the estimates of ρ and β from equation (2), we calculate how quickly (or
slowly) yen funds supplied through yen-selling interventions are oﬀset over time by the
BOJ’s subsequent operations. The result is shown in Figure 7, which indicates that
about 60 percent of one trillion yen supplied through interventions are oﬀset two days
after the intervention is implemented (i.e., the settlement day of the intervention), so
that 400 billion yen remain in the market at that time. The amount of yen funds that
remain in the market decreases over time to 250 billion yen four days later, 170 billion
yen six days later, and 70 billion yen ten days later, and twenty days later the yen
funds have disappeared almost completely from the market. Comparing this with the
preceding period, in which almost 100 percent of funds were oﬀset two days later, yen
funds supplied through interventions tended to stay in the market much longer during
the Great Intervention period.
4.3 Comparison with government payments other than foreign ex-
change interventions
The government pays funds to the private sector in various forms, for example in the
form of public pension payments. The supply of yen funds to the market through yen-
selling interventions is just one form of such government payments. If the BOJ did not
sterilize any form of government payments during the period of quantitative easing,
then the ﬁnding that interventions were not 100 percent sterilized may not be very
surprising. Therefore, we need to know whether or not the central bank distinguishes
between foreign exchange interventions and other government payments, and increases
the degree of nonsterilization in the case of foreign exchange interventions.
To examine this, we denote net government payments on day t by Gt, and gross
government payments and receipts by GPt and GRt. Speciﬁcally, the variables GPt and
GRt are deﬁned as GPt  Gt1(Gt > 0) and GRt  Gt1(Gt < 0), respectively. Note
that although yen-selling interventions are usually included in government payments
in the statistics released by the BOJ, the variable GPt deﬁned here includes only
government payments other than yen-selling interventions. We estimate the following
11Table 4: Interventions and Other Government Payments
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modiﬁed versions of equation (2):
Rt = µ + ρRt 1 + βIt 2 + γGt + ut (3)
Rt = µ + ρRt 1 + βIt 2 + γPGPt + γRGRt + ut (4)
The coeﬃcients β and γ in equation (3) (and β and γP in equation (4)) should be
identical if the BOJ does not distinguish between interventions and other government
payments. In contrast, if the BOJ does distinguish between them and only leaves
interventions unsterilized, then β should be positive, while γ in (3) (or γP in (4))
should be zero.
The estimation results for equations (3) and (4) are presented in Table 4. Starting
with the result for equation (3), the estimated value for β is 0.473 and the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval is 0.294 < β < 0.651. On the other hand, the estimated value for
γ is 0.206 and the 95 percent conﬁdence interval is 0.169 < δ < 0.242. The conﬁdence
intervals of β and γ do not overlap, implying that the BOJ did distinguish between
interventions and other government payments and oﬀset the former less than the latter.
Turning to the result for equation (4), the estimate of β is 0.481 and the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval is 0.304 < β < 0.657, while the estimate of γP is 0.240 and the
95 percent conﬁdence interval is 0.166 < γP < 0.313. As before, the extent to which
12interventions are oﬀset is smaller than the extent to which other government payments
are oﬀset, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant in this case because
the conﬁdence intervals slightly overlap.
5 Sterilization vs. Nonsterilization: Does It Matter at
Near-Zero Interest Rates?
5.1 The eﬀect of unsterilized interventions on the exchange rate through
the expectations channel
So far, we have examined the relationship between interventions and the BOJ’s mone-
tary operations during the Great Intervention period. We found that about 40 percent
of the yen funds injected into the market through yen-selling interventions were not
sterilized on the settlement day and remained in the market for some time. Two ques-
tions naturally arise: Why did the BOJ leave yen-selling interventions partially unster-
ilized? And did interventions have diﬀerent eﬀects on the exchange rate depending on
whether they were sterilized or not?
A sterilized yen-selling intervention is nothing but an exchange of yen-denominated
bonds and dollar-denominated bonds between the monetary authorities and the private
sector. On the other hand, an unsterilized intervention is, by deﬁnition, the combination
of a sterilized intervention and the injection of yen funds into the market through the
purchase of yen-denominated bonds. To the extent that the injection of yen funds
has an additional eﬀect on the exchange rate by lowering nominal interest rates, an
unsterilized intervention has a greater impact on the exchange rate than a sterilized one
(see, for example, Sarno and Taylor 2001). However, Okina and Shiratsuka (2000) and
Spiegel (2003), among others, argue that an unsterilized intervention has no additional
eﬀects on the exchange rate if the economy is in a liquidity trap, because an injection
of yen funds in such a case has no impact on short-term interest rates, which have
already reached the zero lower bound anyway. Put diﬀerently, once money supply
exceeds the satiation level, at which the marginal utility of money is equal to zero,
then the additional injection of money does not have any consequences on the resulting
equilibrium.
It is important to note that their argument is based on the implicit assumption
that money supply increases only momentarily; that is, the central bank does not
oﬀset an increase in yen funds resulting from an intervention in the current period, but
fully sterilizes it in the next period, so that an increase in the BOJ’s current account
13balances occurs only in the current period. But what happens if yen funds injected
through interventions remain in the market for longer periods?
Recent studies on optimal monetary policy in a liquidity trap suggest that there
may be an “expectations channel” through which unsterilized intervention has an addi-
tional impact on the exchange rate when compared with sterilized intervention, even if
short-term interest rates are zero. Suppose that a yen-selling intervention is conducted
when the economy is in a liquidity trap, and that the intervention is not sterilized not
only in the current period but also in future periods. In other words, the case we are
considering here is permanent nonsterilization, which has a permanent impact on the
level of current account balances. An important thing to note is that the yen funds
injected through the intervention remain in the market not only while the economy
is in the liquidity trap, but also when it returns to a normal situation in which the
natural rate of interest (i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate) reverts to a normal
(positive) level. Market participants expect, prior to observing the intervention, that
short-term nominal interest rates will be above zero in future periods when the natural
rate of interest returns to a positive level. After observing the intervention, they up-
date their expectations, taking into account that short-term nominal interest rates in
future periods will be lower due to the increase in current account balances and that,
as a consequence, the foreign exchange value of the yen will be lower. This updated
expectation results in a depreciation of the yen in the current period. The importance
of this expectations channel has been highlighted by various researchers, especially
Svensson (2000) and Jeanne and Svensson (2007).
The eﬀect of unsterilized intervention on the exchange rate through the expecta-
tions channel can be examined by using a simpliﬁed version of equation (2):
Rt = ρRt 1 + βIt 2. (5)
A momentary nonsterilization here corresponds to the case of β > 0 and ρ = 0. In
this case, a yen selling intervention, which is conducted in period t   2 and settled in
period t, leads to an increase in Rt by βIt 2 in period t, but does not have any eﬀect
on Rt+1. This is the case discussed by Okina and Shiratsuka (2000) and Spiegel (2003)
among others. On the other hand, a permanent nonsterilization corresponds to the
case of β > 0 and ρ = 1, in which a yen selling intervention, which is implemented in
period t 2, has an eﬀect not only on Rt but also on Rt+1,Rt+2,Rt+3,... of the same
amount.
However, as we saw in the previous sections, ρ is neither zero nor unity: it is in
14between. That means a yen selling intervention in t   2 leads to changes in current
account balances in and after period t by βIt 2, βρIt 2, βρ2It 2, and so on. Suppose
market participants expect, prior to the implementation of a yen selling intervention
in period t   2, that the nominal interest rate will return to a positive level in period
t + j. An increase in current account balances in period t + j resulting from the yen-
selling intervention in t   2, which is given by βρjIt 2, would be negligible if ρ is
far from unity and/or j is very large. If this is the case, there would be no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in their eﬀect on the current
exchange rate. However, if ρ is suﬃciently close to unity and/or j is not that large,
an unsterilized intervention would have a greater impact on the current exchange rate
than a sterilized intervention. Thus, it is an empirical question whether there is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in terms of their
eﬀects on the exchange rate.
5.2 Empirical results
We estimate a slightly modiﬁed version of an equation for exchange rate dynamics
proposed by Ito (2003, 2004):10
∆st = ϕ0 + ϕ1∆st 1 + ϕ2(st 1   sT
t 1) + ϕ3(1   Bt)It + ϕ4BtIt + ϵt (6)
where st is the New York close of the yen/dollar exchange rate, and ∆st  st   st 1.
Following Ito (2003, 2004), we include a term capturing short-run bandwagon eﬀects,
∆st 1, and a term capturing medium-run mean-reversion eﬀects, st 1 sT
t 1, where sT
represents the backward moving average of the yen/dollar rate.11 Bt is a new variable
which takes a value between zero and one and represents the degree of nonsterilization
on day t + 2 for the intervention implemented on day t (and settled on day t + 2). Bt
10Ito (2004) estimates a GARCH-type exchange rate equation and reports that an intervention of
one trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 0.70 percent in the period prior to the Great Intervention
period (June 1995 to January 2003), but by only 0.38 percent during the Great Intervention period
(January 2003 to March 2004). Fatum and Hutchison (2005) estimate the eﬃcacy of interventions
using a matching algorithm and ﬁnd that interventions during the Great Intervention period did not
have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the yen/dollar rate. These results indicate that interventions were less
eﬀective during the Great Intervention period. However, to our knowledge, there is no research on the
diﬀerence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in terms of their eﬀects on the exchange
rate during this period.
11One of the diﬃculties in estimating the eﬀect of interventions is the endogeneity problem: the
error term ϵt and It in eq. (6) are not independent, since the central bank reacts to ﬂuctuations in the
exchange rate. Chen et al. (2011), for example, consequently argue that the eﬃcacy of interventions is
considerably underestimated due to the endogeneity problem. However, addressing this issue is beyond
the scope of this paper. See Kearns and Rigobon (2005) and Chen et al. (2011) for more on this issue
as well as some methods to eliminate endogeneity bias.
15is equal to unity if the intervention is not sterilized at all and equal to zero if it is fully
sterilized. Note that the degree of nonsterilization on day t + 2 is not observable on
day t, so that Bt represents an expectation made by market participants on day t. The
term (1   Bt)It represents the amount of sterilized interventions, while the term BtIt
represents the amount of unsterilized interventions.
We construct Bt in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst way is based on the assumption
of backward-looking expectation; namely, we assume that market participants expect
that an intervention conducted today and to be settled two days later is likely to be
unsterilized if they observe unsterilized interventions in the recent past, and vice versa.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne Bt as
Bt =
{
1 if βt  k
0 otherwise
(7)
where βt is the rolling regression estimate of β in equation (1) whose time series
is given in Figure 5, and k is a parameter taking a value between zero and unity.
The window of the rolling regression is the preceding 750 days.12 The second way to
construct Bt is based on the assumption of perfect foresight; that is, we assume that
market participants are able to make a perfect forecast on day t about the degree of
nonsterilization on day t+2, ∆Rt+2/It. Speciﬁcally, we assume that market participants
had expected full nonsterilization, Bt = 1, on days when the actual value of ∆Rt+2/It
turned out to be suﬃciently large, and full sterilization, Bt = 0, on the other days.
That is, we deﬁne Bt as follows:
Bt =
{
1 if ∆Rt+2/It  k
0 otherwise
(8)
The regression results are presented in Table 5. Speciﬁcally, the table shows the
results when Bt is deﬁned as described in equations (7) and (8) and when k = 0.4 and
k = 0.5 are chosen. In addition to a simple OLS regression, we also run a GARCH
regression over the period of January 2003 to March 2004. The result for the ﬁrst OLS
regression shows that the estimates of ϕ3 and ϕ4 are 0.0025 and 0.0045, respectively,
indicating that interventions that are fully sterilized have only a weak (and statistically
insigniﬁcant) eﬀect on the exchange rate, while interventions that are not sterilized
12An alternative would be to directly use βt as a proxy of Bt rather than converting βt to Bt as
described in eq. (7). Doing so, we ﬁnd that the regression results are essentially the same.
16Table 5: The Eﬀects of Sterilized and Unsterilized Interventions on the Yen/Dollar
Exchange Rate
Bt is deﬁned as in equation (7) Bt is deﬁned as in equation (8)
k = 0.4 k = 0.5 k = 0.4 k = 0.5
OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH
ϕ0 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ϕ1 -0.038 -0.042 -0.039 -0.043 -0.047 -0.054 -0.045 -0.048
(0.061) (0.065) (0.060) (0.064) (0.061) (0.067) (0.061) (0.065)
ϕ2 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
ϕ3 0.0025 0.0024** 0.0025 0.0023** 0.0014 0.0006 0.0026 0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0016)
ϕ4 0.0045*** 0.0044** 0.0052*** 0.0051** 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0038*** 0.0038***
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014)
ϕ4   ϕ3 0.0020 0.0021 0.0027 0.0027 0.0030 0.0038* 0.0013 0.0016
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020)
Obs. 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: The sample period is January 15, 2003 to March 31, 2004. The window of the rolling regression is the
preceding 750 days. The GARCH speciﬁcation is GARCH(1,1). In addition, the same notes as for Table 2
apply.
at all have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the exchange rate.13 This result remains
basically unchanged even when we employ a GARCH model (see the next column) and
when we use a diﬀerent value for k. However, as shown in the row labeled “ϕ4   ϕ3,”
the diﬀerence between ϕ4 and ϕ3 is still small relative to the standard error, so that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact of sterilized and unsterilized
interventions on the exchange rate is identical. Turning to the case in which Bt is
deﬁned as in equation (8), we see again that sterilized interventions are not eﬀective
while unsterilized ones are eﬀective. Overall, the regression results indicate that, during
the Great Intervention period, interventions had diﬀerent eﬀects on the exchange rate
depending on whether they were sterilized or not, thus pointing at the possibility that
market participants updated their expectations about future money supply based on
the observation that interventions were not fully sterilized.
13The regression result indicates that a yen-selling intervention of one trillion yen moves the
yen/dollar rate by 0.25 percent when it is fully sterilized, while it move the exchange rate by 0.45
percent when it is not sterilized at all. Thus, a yen-selling intervention of one trillion yen with 60
percent sterilization (this is the estimated degree of sterilization in Table 3) moves the yen/dollar
rate by 0.33 percent. This estimate is almost the same as the one Ito (2004) obtains for the Great
Intervention period (i.e., 0.38 percent per one trillion yen) without discriminating between sterilized
and unsterilized interventions.
176 Conclusion
Using daily data on foreign exchange interventions and current account balances at
the Bank of Japan, this paper examined the relationship between interventions and
monetary policy during the period from January 2003 to March 2004. The ﬁndings
can be summarized as follows. First, roughly 60 percent of the funds supplied to the
market through yen-selling foreign exchange interventions were oﬀset (i.e., sterilized)
by monetary operations by the Bank of Japan, while the remaining 40 percent were
not oﬀset. Moreover, the funds that were not oﬀset remained in the market for some
time. This result contrasts with the situation before this period, when 100 percent
of the funds of foreign exchange interventions were oﬀset, showing that the extent to
which interventions were not sterilized during January 2003 to March 2004 was quite
considerable.
Second, comparing yen funds supplied through foreign exchange interventions and
yen funds supplied through other government payments (such as pension payments),
we found that the extent to which funds remained in the market was greater, and the
time span longer, in the case of the former than the latter. This suggests that the BOJ
in its monetary operations distinguished between foreign exchange interventions and
other government payments.
Third, an unsterilized yen-selling intervention had a greater impact on the exchange
rate than a sterilized one during this period, indicating that it matters whether an in-
tervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is in a liquidity trap. This result
suggests that market participants updated their expectations about future money sup-
ply based on the observation that yen-selling interventions were not fully sterilized.
In this paper, we focused on the Great Intervention period. The Japanese monetary
authorities stopped intervening at the end of this period (i.e., March 2004) and then did
not intervene at all for 77 months. However, recently, they have restarted yen-selling
interventions to counteract the rapid appreciation of the yen. On the other hand, the
BOJ restarted with massive money injections in response to the global ﬁnancial crisis
in the fall of 2008. In this sense, the same combination of monetary and intervention
policies as before has reemerged. Are the recent interventions sterilized or not? Do they
have diﬀerent impacts on the exchange rate depending on whether they are sterilized or
not? Are there any diﬀerences from what we found for the Great Intervention period?
Addressing these questions using the empirical framework we developed in this paper
would be an important step to check the robustness of the empirical results we obtained
18for the Great Intervention period. This is a task we hope to address in the future.
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Figure 1: Current account balances at the Bank of Japan 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of current account balances   







Note: This figure shows the distribution of daily current account balances during the period of 
January 20, 2004 to March 9, 2006, when the target range was set at 30-35 trillion. To estimate 
the probability density function, we use a normal kernel and the likelihood cross-validation 
method to select the bandwidth (see Silverman 1986).   
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Figure 3: Daily amounts of yen-selling interventions   
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Figure 4: Contemporaneous correlation between interventions   

































Figure 5: Rolling regression of the degree of nonsterilization 
 
 
Notes: The bold line represents the estimated value of β, while the dotted lines are the upper 
and lower bound of the 90% confidence interval. The window of the rolling regression is the 




























































































































































































Elapsed days since the implementation of a yen-selling intervention  
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